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Abstract. In this paper, we propose a novel framework for group authen-
tication and key exchange protocols. There are three main advantages of
our framework. First, it is a general one, where diﬀerent cryptographic
primitives can be used for diﬀerent applications. Second, it works in a
one-to-multiple mode, where a party can authenticate several parties
mutually. Last, it can provide several security features, such as protec-
tion against passive adversaries and impersonate attacks, implicit key
authentication, forward and backward security. There are two types of
protocols in our framework. The main diﬀerence between them is that
the authenticator in Type II has a certiﬁcate while in Type I does not.
Under the general framework, we also give the details of protocols based
on Diﬃe-Hellman key exchange system, and discrete logarithm prob-
lem (DLP) or elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP) based
ElGamal encryption respectively. Session keys will be established at the
end of each session and they can be utilized later to protect messages
transmitted on the communication channel.
Keywords: Group authentication · Diﬃe-Hellman key exchange ·
Discrete logarithm problem · Elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem
1 Introduction
Online social networks (OSNs) are platforms oﬀering social services in an online
format, and they became very popular during recent years. OSNs can be used
in many ways, such as news sharing, group chatting and video conferences and
so on. For all these applications, authentication is of great importance. Con-
sider the example of group chatting. All group members should be whom one
expects to communicate with, and messages delivered between them should also
be protected. It is also very important for servers to authenticate their clients.
However, due to the large number of clients for most OSNs, the time spent by
servers to authenticate clients may become a bottleneck of the whole service if
it is done in the traditional one-to-one mode. Therefore, an eﬃcient and secure
protocol for authenticating and key exchanges is needed.
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Authentication can be achieved by usernames and passwords [1,2] or public
certiﬁcates [3]. Password based approach is usually selected for the authentica-
tion in a client and server mode, where usernames and passwords are required.
For certiﬁcate based authentication, however, a public key infrastructure is
needed to be built ﬁrst and then an initiation phase for key distribution is
required. Besides, key based authentication works in a one-to-one mode, so only
one user or client can be authenticated each time. To save both time and band-
width, group authentication [4] is proposed in this paper. Under most circum-
stances, group authentication is related to group key management in multimedia
or wireless network and etc. It is mainly used to prove that a member belongs
to a certain group without revealing its identity. However, we give a new deﬁni-
tion of group authentication in this paper, where all members in a group can be
authenticated at one time. The main diﬀerence between the traditional deﬁnition
and ours is that the former aims at authentication without revealing anonymity
while ours is to save time and increase authentication eﬃciency. This new deﬁni-
tion of group authentication has already been proposed in [2], which is password
based authentication and can be used to verify multiple users’ identities at the
same time. We will adopt this new deﬁnition in our paper.
Compared with existing work, our paper mainly has three contributions. First
of all, the authentication in all our protocols is group based, and thus it is more
eﬀective and can save both bandwidth and time. Secondly, our framework is a
general one and can be based on diﬀerent cryptographic primitives. Meanwhile,
we give two detailed applications using DLP [5] and ECDLP [6] based ElGamal
encryption [7]. Finally, our protocols can satisfy security requirements such as
mutual and implicit key authentication, protection against passive adversaries
and impersonation attacks and forward and backward secrecy. Later, we will
give detailed proofs for each of these security requirements.
2 Related Work
A lot of research has already been done in the area of authentication and key
exchanges [8,9]. We will mainly discuss those related to group authentication
rather than authentication in the one-to-one mode. As mentioned in Sect. 1,
the traditional group authentication is to prove that a member belongs to a
certain group. Among all approaches to achieve it, group signatures [10] and
ring signatures [11] are often used. In group signatures, a member of a group or
the signer generates a signature, a veriﬁer can check whether the signer belongs
to this group or not, without knowing the singer’s identity. However, the manager
of this group can “open” the signature and thus the identity of the signer will be
revealed if necessary. Ring signature is based on public key system. There is no
group manager, and a signer can choose anyone whose public key is registered in
a trusted authority to create a random group. The signer uses its own secret key
and other members’ public keys to generate a signature. The other members can
deny that the signature is created by them and the real identity of the signer
can be revealed in this way.
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There are also some other researches based on group or ring signatures. The
protocol in [12] is based on digital signature algorithm (DSA) [13] and is designed
to authenticate vehicles. However, the sender or authenticator deals with the
received responses from each vehicle separately because each vehicle encrypts
its response by the authenticator’s public key. As a result, this protocol does
not contribute much to saving computational cost. In [14], the protocol is DSA
and DLP based. It can be used to authenticate a group member, subgroups or
all members in a group, but it diﬀers from our protocols in several ways. First
of all, in their protocol there should be a group leader or a trusted party, who
signs the message ﬁrst and checks whether other users’ signatures are valid or
not. Secondly, it is designed for an outsider to authenticate a group who shares a
public key, while the outsider does not need to know any of the group members.
Similarly, the model proposed in [15] is also designed for an outsider to verify the
signature of a group, so theoretically it can be used to authenticate a group of
members. However, the group should be stable and every member should have a
certiﬁcate. In [16], a series of protocols are designed for batch or group authen-
tication in a one-to-multiple mode. They can be applied to a scenario where
strangers are to be authenticated by a party under the help of a trusted friend
in a P2P based decentralized social network. They propose protocols based on
one-way hash function [17], ElGamal signature [7,18] and certiﬁcates respec-
tively. However, even though their one-way hash function based protocol in [16]
can be utilized to authenticate a group of members, the computational cost does
not decrease compared with that in a one-to-one mode, so it does not beneﬁt
much in time saving on the authenticator’s side. Their work diﬀers from ours in
several ways. The most signiﬁcant diﬀerence is that we emphasis on a general
framework where several cryptographic primitives can be used to it, rather than
speciﬁc primitives. Besides, the protocols in [14,15] do not provide key exchange
functionality, and they are not ﬁt for the authentication inside a group. In this
paper, we propose a framework for the mutual authentication within a group
and it also provides key exchanges.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 3, two usage scenar-
ios are introduced ﬁrst. Then the main notations and parameters that will be
used later in our framework are explained and the framework for both types of
protocols is described. Next, two examples are given to demonstrate how our
framework works. Finally, a formal description of what cryptographic primitives
can be used to our framework is presented. The correctness and security analysis
are presented in Sects. 4, 5 respectively. In Sect. 6, we will give some comparisons
of the computation and communication costs of our protocols and the traditional
one-to-one mode ones. Finally, we conclude this paper in the last section and
give some suggestions about how to apply our framework.
3 The General Framework
In this section, we ﬁrstly explain two typical usage scenarios where our framework
can be applied, and then the general parameters, notations, message ﬂows of our
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(a) Relations between the Authenticator
and his or her Friends
(b) Relations between the Server and its
Clients
Fig. 1. Relations of two parties in two scenarios. a Relations between the authenticator
and his or her friends. b Relations between the server and its clients
general framework are presented. Next, we implement some speciﬁc primitives
of our framework to demonstrate how it works. Finally, we describe which kinds
of cryptographic primitives can be applied to our framework.
3.1 Two Usage Scenarios
All protocols in our framework are suitable for two scenarios, illustrated in Fig. 1.
In scenario 1(a), an ordinary user temporarily creates a group with his or her
friends and authenticates each of them. Scenario 1(b) is for a server to authen-
ticate several of its clients. Both the group initiator and the server shares some
secrets with his or her friends or its clients, and it will use these secrets for
mutual authentication later. Our protocols have two goals: mutual authenti-
cation and session key agreement. At the end of each session, session keys are
established. The group session key is generated by the authenticator and distrib-
uted to each group member, while the other session keys are computed according
to Diﬃe-Hellman [19] key exchange. In scenario 1(b), however, only session keys
between the server and its clients are established. Our protocols can be divided
into two types. The main diﬀerence between them is that the authenticator in
Type I does not have a certiﬁcate while a certiﬁcation is needed in Type II, and
thus the authenticator is authenticated diﬀerently in protocols of Type I and
Type II.
3.2 Parameters and Notations
The parameters and notations for all protocols are listed in Table 1. Among
them, we will only give some explanations to ki. For both scenarios mentioned in
Sect. 3.1, ki is a long time shared secret, generated by UA and has been delivered
to Ui via a safe channel in advance. For the ﬁrst scenario, since we assume that
the number of UA’s friends is not big, it is practical to generate enough pairwise
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Table 1. Parameters and notations
Symbol Description
UA The authenticator to authenticate a group of users or clients denoted
by U
U A user group to be authenticated, U = {U1, U2, . . . , UN}
N The number of members in group U
IDA The identity of UA
IDi The identity of Ui, i ∈ {1, . . . , N}
UID Identities of all members in U, UID = {ID1, ID2, . . . , IDN}
H() One-way hash function with the output of length l,
H() : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}l
MAC The message authentication code generated by a keyed hash function
ξ ξ = {IDA, UID}, message used for group authentication
KG Group session key, generated by UA during a speciﬁed session, one
time use
SKAi Session key between UA and Ui in a speciﬁed session, one time use
SKij Session key between Ui and Uj in a speciﬁed session, one time use
SKA UA’s private key
SIGNK(m) The signature of message m with private key K
KPA Key parameters generated by UA, KPA = {gm1 , . . . , gmN } in DLP
based protocols and KPA = {m1G, . . . ,mN G} in ECDLP based
protocols
KPU Key parameters generated by members in U, KPU = {gn1 , . . . , gnN } in
the DLP based protocol and KPU = {n1G, . . . , nN G} in the ECDLP
based protocol
ki ki ∈ K = {k1, k2, . . . , kN}. It is a long time shared secret between UA
and Ui. ki, kj (1 ≤ i, j ≤ N, i = j) are pairwise prime
ti One-time nonce, used to make sure of the freshness of a session
q, p Large prime numbers, and q = 2p + 1
g The generator of the cyclic multiplicative group Gq
yA A secret shared between UA and members in U
yi yi = g
xi/xiG in the DLP and ECDLP based protocols respectively
It is a secret shared between UA and Ui
G Base point of the selected elliptic curve
prime numbers ki. In the second scenario, there can be a huge number of users
per server. In this case, UA can generate several groups of diﬀerent ki, where
they are pairwise prime within the same group. As a result, UA can authenticate
clients with ki within the same group at one time. However, this mechanism is
needed only when the number of clients exceeds the threshold that the server
can deal with.
3.3 Message Flows
There are four steps in our framework and the message ﬂows are illustrated
in Fig. 2. During the message ﬂows, Ci, Vi and Wi all depends on diﬀerent
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Fig. 2. Message ﬂows of the general framework
cryptographic primitives and will be explained later. The details of the four
steps of message ﬂows are as follows:
(1) UA → U1 : IDA, UID,X,C0,MACA.
(2) Ui → Ui+1 : IDi, UID,X,KPU , Ci,MACi,where
1 ≤ i ≤ N − 1.
(3) UN → UA : IDN ,KPU , CN ,MACN .
(4) UA → U : Y,MAC ′A.
(1) UA initiates a new session in this step. It calculates X by formula (1) using
the Chinese remainder theorem (CRT) [20], but it has to be sure that Vi ⊕
ki < ki (1 ≤ i ≤ N) (The details will be explained later in Sect. 3.4.).
X ≡ Vi ⊕ ki (mod ki),where 1 ≤ i ≤ N. (1)
Here, Vi should contain the identity information of both UA and Ui, group
session key KG, session key parameters and a cryptographic primitive hi
for UA’s authentication. We use one-way hash functions to compute hi in
this paper for simplicity. Then UA generates C0 which will be used by Ui
to compute Ci. Finally, UA computes MACA and sends it to U1. After U1
receives the message, it gets V1 by X(mod ki) ⊕ k1, extracts parameters in
it and checks MACA. If MACA is valid, it continues and the authentication
for UA by U1 is achieved or else it aborts the session. Next it calculates the
session key with UA.
(2) Ui randomly generates its key parameter, appends it to KPU and computes
Ci. Finally, it calculates MACi and then sends the message to the next user.
After Ui+1 receives the message, what it does is the same as U1 in step (1).
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(3) The behavior of UN is the same as U1. After UA receives the message from
UN , it checks the validity of MACN ﬁrst. If it is valid, it computes C ′N
and checks whether C ′N = CN holds. If it does, the group authentication is
achieved.
(4) UA generates Y by formula (2) and Wi ⊕ ki < ki must hold.
Y ≡ Wi ⊕ ki (mod ki), where 1 ≤ i ≤ N. (2)
When Ui receives message as step (4) , it proceeds as follows.
(a) Check MAC ′A to make sure that the message is not tampered.
(b) Get Wi by Y (mod ki) ⊕ ki.
(c) Retrieve parameters from Wi. If it contains {IDA, IDi}, Ui is successfully
authenticated. Then it calculates session keys with Uj (1 ≤ j ≤ N, i = j)
and erase its key parameter.
3.4 DLP Based Protocols
The same as the message ﬂows described in Sect. 3.3, the DLP based protocols
include four steps and the following are the details.
(1) Let C0 = ξ(r) = ξ(grA ), where rA ∈ [1, p − 1] is randomly generated.
Vi is derived from V ′i . In the protocol of Type I, V
′
i = {yi ⊕ KG, yi ⊕
ti, g
mi , hi}, where hi = H(IDA ⊕ IDi ⊕ yA ⊕ ti), while in Type II, V ′i =
SIGNSKA{IDA, IDi,KG, gmi , ti}. As mentioned in Sect. 3.3, we should
make sure that Xi ⊕ ki < ki and Wi ⊕ ki < ki. Suppose the security para-
meters of ki and also the length of V ′i is sl(ki), then the length of ki should
be l(ki) > sl(ki) and the highest l(ki) − sl(ki) bits are used for the purpose
of CRT. When ki is generated, the highest l(ki) − sl(ki) bits are initiated
as 1. The highest l(ki) − sl(ki) bits of Vi are also initiated as 1 and the rest
bits are the same as V ′i , so we can be sure that Vi ⊕ ki < ki holds. The same
approach will be applied to generate Wi.
(2) In protocols of Type I, the authentication of UA by Ui is obtained by checking
hi. After Ui gets Vi, it extracts ti, computes h′t = H(IDA⊕IDi⊕yA⊕ti) and
checks whether h′i = hi holds. If it does, UA is successfully authenticated.
Furthermore, C1 = ξ(rx1) and Ci = Ci−1 × rxi = ξ(r
∑i
t=1 xt) (2 ≤ i ≤
N). The session keys SKAi and SKij are calculated as gmini and gninj
respectively.
(3) UA authenticates the whole user group by checking whether C ′N = CN holds,
where C ′N = ξ(
∏N
t=1 y
r
A
t ).
(4) Let W ′i = {IDA, IDi,KPi} and KPi = KPU − {gni}.
3.5 ECDLP Based Protocols
The same as the DLP based protocols, the authentication of UA by Ui of ECDLP
based protocols also depends on the one-way hash function. Parameters and
users’ behaviors about ECDLP based protocols are listed as follows.
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(1) Let C0 = Gr = rAG, where rA ∈ [1, n − 1] is randomly selected. In the pro-
tocol of Type I, V ′i = {yi ⊕KG,miG, yi ⊕ ti, hi}, where hi = H(IDA ⊕IDi ⊕
yA ⊕ ti). For the protocol of Type II, however, V ′i = SIGNSKA{IDA, IDi,
KG,miG, ti}.
(2) In the protocol of Type I, the authentication of UA by Ui is also obtained
by checking hi. Furthermore, C1 = ξ(x1Gr) and Ci = Ci−1 + ξ(xiGr) =
ξ(r
A
∑i
t=1 xtG) (2 ≤ i ≤ N − 1). The session keys SKAi and SKij are
computed as miniG and ninjG (1 ≤ i, j ≤ N, i = j).
(3) UA authenticates the whole user group by checking whether C ′N = CN holds,
where C ′N = ξ(
∑N
t=1 rAyi).
(4) Let W ′i = {IDA, IDi,KPi} and KPi = KPU − {niG}.
3.6 Requirements of Cryptographic Primitives
The DLP and ECDLP based protocols described above are only two speciﬁc
examples and other cryptographic primitives can also be implemented to our
framework. Suppose the underlying cryptographic scheme we use is F , ∗ is
the operation that joins the results of Ui and Ui+1 (1 ≤ i ≤ N − 1) and ◦
is the operation that UA uses for the shared secrets. Let fi = F (ξ, ki), where ξ
is the message as illustrated in Table 1, fi is the result of what Ui calculates and
ki is the secret parameter shared between UA and Ui. If Eq. (3) holds, then it
can be applied to our framework.
f1 ∗ · · · ∗ fN = F (ξ, k1 ◦ · · · ◦ kN ) (3)
The left side of Eq. (3) means that it needs N times operation of F to authen-
ticate all members in U in the traditional one-to-one mode. However, the same
goal can be achieved by only performing F once and ◦ N times, where ◦ is
supposed to be much more time saving compared with F .
In our DLP and ECDLP based protocols, we use one-way hash functions
to authenticate UA, however, many other cryptographic primitives can be used,
such as ElGamal signature, DSA and so on, depending on diﬀerent user scenarios
or devices etc.
4 Correctness Analysis
Since our framework does not include speciﬁc cryptographic primitives for mutual
authentication, we will only give the correctness analysis to DLP and ECDLP
based protocols.
4.1 Correctness of DLP Based Protocols
In the protocol of Type I, the authentication for UA by Ui is promised by checking
whether h′i is equal to hi, where h
′
i is the hash value calculated by Ui. After
deriving Vi by X⊕ki, Ui calculates ti by yi⊕ti⊕yi. Besides, yA is shared between
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UA and Ui, so if UA is not impersonated or compromised by an adversary, h′i = hi
will hold. However, the authentication of UA in Type II is achieved by public
key signature system.
Next, we will discuss the correctness of group authentication by UA. U1 calcu-
lates C1 by C1 = rx1 = ξ(grAx1). After Ui (2 ≤ i ≤ N) receives Ci−1, it calculates
Ci according to Ci = Ci−1×rxi = ξ(grA
∑i
t=1 xt). Therefore, CN = ξ(grA
∑N
t=1 xt)
and when UA receives CN , it calculates C ′N as C
′
N = ξ((g
x1 × · · · × gxN )rA ) =
ξ(grA
∑N
t=1 xt). We can see that CN = C ′N holds. Thus, the mutual authentication
is correct for protocols of both types.
4.2 Correctness of ECDLP Based Protocols
The authentication of UA in Type I and Type II are promised by one-way
hash function and public key signature system respectively, the same as illus-
trated in Sect. 4.1, but the authentication of U relies on CN . C1 = ξ(x1Gr) =
ξ(r
A
x1G) and Ci = Ci−1 + ξ(xiGr) = ξ(rA
∑i
t=1 xtG) (2 ≤ i ≤ N). Thus,
CN = ξ(rA
∑N
t=1 xtG). So after UA receives the message from UN , it calculates
C ′N as C
′
N = ξ(rA(G1 + G2 + · · · + GN )) = ξ(rA
∑N
t=1 Gt). It is straightforward
that CN equals to C ′N .
5 Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze the security requirements of both DLP and ECDLP
based protocols. In this paper, we only consider passive adversaries denoted
by E, who can only receive messages on the communication channel and then
analyzing them acting as a probabilistic polynomial time Turing machine.
5.1 Security Requirements
Both types of our protocols provide mutual and group authentication, protection
against passive adversaries and impersonation attacks. They also satisfy implicit
key authentication, forward and backward secrecy. We will use the theory of
random oracle (RO) [21] and decisional Diﬃe-Hellman (DDH) [22] assumption
to prove these security requirements. First of all, we will introduce the following
two assumptions based on which our security proofs are derived.
Assumption 1 DLP based DDH Assumption. Suppose Gp is a cyclic group
of order p with generator g. a, b, c ∈ [1, |Gp|] are randomly generated. Given ga,
gb and gc, it is supposed that there is no probabilistic polynomial time algorithm
to distinguish gab and gc.
Assumption 2 ECDLP based DDH Assumption. Suppose EG is a secure
non-singular elliptic curve with G as its base point and n its order, a, b, c ∈
[1, n − 1] are randomly generated. Given aG, bG and cG, it is supposed that
there is no probabilistic polynomial time algorithm to distinguish abG and cG.
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Group authentication. It means that UA can authenticate all members in user
group U at one time. From the correctness analysis in Sect. 4, it is obvious that
both the DLP and ECDLP based protocols can provide group authentication.
Mutual authentication. At the end of each protocol, UA can authenticate
each member Ui in U, and Ui can also authenticate UA. From both Sect. 4 and
the message ﬂows in Sect. 3, we can see that the authentication of U and UA
can be achieved in step (3) and (4) respectively if the protocol is successfully
executed.
Theorem 1. Based on Assumption 1 and 2, both the DLP and ECDLP based
protocols are against passive adversaries, which means:
(1) E cannot derive any information about yA from hi;
(2) E cannot derive any information about ξ from Ci.
Proof. In the ﬁrst step, we will prove that hi is secure against passive adversaries.
Since yA is protected by the one-away hash function H, based on the theory of
RO in [21], the probability that E derives any useful information about yi from
H(IDA ⊕ IDi ⊕ yA ⊕ ti) is negligible.
In the second step, we prove that E cannot obtain any information about ξ.
In DLP and ECDLP based protocols, CN is computed by Ci = ξ(grA
∑i
t=1 xt)
and Ci = ξ(rA
∑i
t=1 xtG), where C0 is ξ(g
r
A ) and ξ(r
A
G) respectively. Obvi-
ously, they are DLP and ECDLP based ElGamal encryption. According to the
results in [18], ElGamal encryption is as hard as DDH problem. Thus, based on
Assumption 1 and 2, Ci is secure against passive adversaries. 
unionsq
Theorem 2. Based on Assumption 1 and 2, and the diﬃculties of DLP and
ECDLP, both the DLP and ECDLP based protocols are against impersonation
attacks, which means:
(1) E cannot forge hi to impersonate UA;
(2) E cannot forge Ci to impersonate Ui.
Proof. According to (1) of Theorem1, we know that E cannot derive any infor-
mation about yA. And then based on the robustness of one-way hash function
[17,23], it is impossible for E to forge hi without the knowledge of yA or ti.
Next, we will demonstrate that it is impossible for E to forge Ci. Accord-
ing to diﬃculties of DLP and ECDLP, E cannot derive xi without compromis-
ing Ui. Thus, it generates li instead and computes C ′i = ξ(g
r
A
∑i
i=1 li)/C ′i =
ξ(r
A
∑i
i=1 liG) (To simplify our presentation, we will use the symbol “/” to
represent “or’.’). Since rA is only known to UA, E needs to successfully gener-
ate
∑i
i=1 li such that ξ(g
r
A
∑i
i=1 li)/ξ(r
A
∑i
i=1 liG) equals to ξ(g
r
A
∑i
i=1 xi)/ξ(r
A∑i
i=1 xiG). Again, according to the diﬃculties of DLP and ECDLP, E can-
not deduce
∑N
i=1 xi. However, it can compute the right value of ξ(g
r
A
∑i
i=1 xi)/
ξ(r
A
∑i
i=1 xiG), which is contradictory to Assumption 1 and 2. As a result, both
the DLP and ECDLP based protocols are against impersonate attacks. 
unionsq
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Theorem 3. Based on the diﬃculties of DLP and ECDLP, Assumption 1 and 2,
and the security of CRT, both the DLP and ECDLP based protocols can provide
implicit key authentication, which means:
(1) Only UA and Ui can access to the group session key KG;
(2) Only UA and Ui can compute the right session key SKAi;
(3) Only Ui and Uj can compute the right session key SKij, where 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N
and i = j.
Proof. From the formats of Vi and message ﬂows, we know that KG is protected
by CRT. Therefore, E cannot get KG without knowing ki.
As for the session key SKAi, it is computed by parameters gmi/miG and
gni/niG based Diﬃe-Hellman key exchange system. gni/niG is transmitted in
plaintext, however, E cannot derive ni by the diﬃculties of DLP and ECDLP.
So the only way for E to obtain SKAi is to compute it by both key parameters,
but this is contradict to Assumption 1 and 2.
The security of session key SKij is almost the same as SKAi, with the excep-
tion that both gni/niG and gnj/njG are exposed to the adversaries. For the same
reason as mentioned above, E cannot derive session key SKij .
As a result, both DLP and ECDLP based protocols are proved to provide
implicit key authentication. 
unionsq
Theorem 4. Based on the diﬃculties of DLP and ECDLP, Assumption 1 and
2, both the DLP and ECDLP based protocols can provide forward secrecy, which
means: the exposure of session key SKAi,r or SKij,r in session sr will not lead
to the exposure of session key SKAi,t or SKij,t in session st, where 1 ≤ t < r.
Proof. Suppose that all parameters speciﬁed to session sr have been exposed to
an adversary E. Here, parameters speciﬁed to a session refer to those newly gen-
erated in this session, and will be expired when this session ﬁnishes, not including
those shared in all sessions. Let gmi,r/mi,rG and gni,r/ni,rG be the key parame-
ters in session sr, gmi,t/mi,tG and gni,t/ni,tG be the key parameters in session
st. Session keys SKAi,r = gmi,rni,r/mi,rni,rG and SKij,r = gni,rnj,r/ni,rnj,rG
are exposed to E. Since mi and ni for each session are randomly generated,
and those in a diﬀerent session cannot be deduced by them. Consequently, even
though SKAi,r and SKij,r are exposed, mi,t, ni,t and nj,t are still unknown to
E, and only gmi,t , gni,t and gnj,t are known. Based on the diﬃculties of DLP and
ECDLP, E cannot get mi,t, ni,t or nj,t from them. And also by Assumption 1 and
2, we know E cannot compute either gmi,tni,t/mi,tni,tG or gni,tnj,t/ni,tnj,tG.
As a result,both the DLP and ECDLP based protocols can provide forward
secrecy. 
unionsq
Theorem 5. Based on the diﬃculties of DLP and ECDLP, Assumption 1 and
2, both the DLP and ECDLP based protocols can provide backward secrecy, which
means: the exposure of session key SKAi,t or SKij,t in session st will not lead
to the exposure of session key SKAi,r or SKij,r in session sr, where 1 ≤ t < r.
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Proof. The proof of Theorem5 is similar to that of Theorem4. The only diﬀer-
ence is that parameters speciﬁed to a session st cannot be utilized to deduce
those in a later session sr. 
unionsq
Except all these security requirements discussed on the above, there is one
issue worthy explaining. When UA and all members in U calculate MAC, the key
they utilize is KG. Thus there is a possibility that any user who has obtained KG
can tamper another user’s message and then calculate the right MAC. However,
since the purpose of any user in U is to get authenticated by UA, we assume that
they will not carry out this kind of inside attacks.
6 Comparisons
Except for authentication and key exchanges, another two purposes we want
to achieve in our framework are to save both computation and communication
costs. According to Eq. (3), we know that the computation cost mainly depends
on operation F and ◦, denoted by CF and C◦ respectively. There are three
possibilities. First, if C◦ is negligible compared with CF , the computation cost
of our framework is O(1) rather than O(N) in the one-to-one mode with respect
to CF . Second, if C◦ is almost the same as CF , the computation cost will be
O(N) in both modes. The last possibility is the opposite to the ﬁrst one, and
then our framework becomes more time consuming instead of time saving.
Unlike the complexity of computation cost, our protocol can save some com-
munication cost in general. However, the extent to which it can save depends on
many factors, such as which cryptographic primitives are chosen, the length of
security parameters and so on. To better compare the communication cost, the
general message ﬂows of the traditional one-to-one mode protocol can be simply
described as follows.
(1) UA → Ui : IDA, IDi, yi ⊕ KG, yi ⊕ ti, gmi/miG,hi, C0,MACA.
or: IDA, SIGNSKA{IDi, yi ⊕ KG, yi ⊕ ti, gmi/miG}, C0,MACA.
(2) Ui → UA : IDi, IDA, t′i, gni/niG,Ci,MACi.
(3) UA → U : IDA, IDi,KPi,MAC ′A.
Here, all the parameters have the same meaning as explained in Table 1.
Since the possibility of a bottleneck in communication can mostly happen at
UA, we will only compute the communication cost of UA. Then in the following,
Table 2. Lengths of parameters (Bits)
ID KG ti/t
′
i g
mi/miG hi CN MAC
DLP based 32 128 128 1,024 160 1,024 160
ECDLP based 32 128 128 160 160 160 160
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(a) Communication Cost Comparisons Of
Protocols of Type I
(b) Communication Cost Comparisons Of
Protocols of Type II
Fig. 3. Communication cost comparisons.
we will show the experiments results about our DLP and ECDLP based proto-
cols in Fig. 3, and the lengths of parameters we use are listed in Table 2. From
the ﬁgures, we can see that there are big diﬀerences between one-to-one (1-1)
and one-to-multiple (1-m) modes, and also some diﬀerences between DLP and
ECDLP based protocols. Suppose the number of user group is N as stated in
Table 1, and then the communication cost for protocols in one-to-one mode is
O(N2) but O(N) for one-to-multiple mode protocols. When the number of par-
ties to be authenticated is small, there is not much diﬀerence. However, when N
increases, the diﬀerences will grow fast. Therefore, for systems that have large
numbers of users to be authenticated frequently or the computation or commu-
nication resources are limited, our framework can gain an obvious advantage.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we propose a general framework where diﬀerent cryptographic
primitives can be applied to authenticate several users or clients at one time in
two scenarios, where authenticators are with or without certiﬁcates. In our proto-
cols, mutual authentication can be achieved at the third step. The fourth step for
protocols of Type I is optional, since it aims at establishing session keys between
diﬀerent members in group U. By applying our framework, the authenticator
can authenticates users or clients in a one-to-multiple mode, which is more eﬀec-
tive and thus less time consuming. To demonstrate how our framework works,
we give two example, i.e., DLP and ECDLP based protocols. Based on these
two examples, we prove that our protocols satisfy certain security requirements,
such as against passive and impersonation attacks, and providing implicit key
authentication, forward and backward secrecy. In applications of our framework,
it is suggested that the certiﬁcate-based systems should be the same as the cryp-
tographic primitives to simplify the calculations and also save resources.
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